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INTRODUCTION 
Tree Supply, LLC was formed for a single purpose: to sell 
landscaping trees for a profit. To accomplish this goal, Tree Supply 
partnered with Cornelio Garcia, who would purchase trees in Oregon, and 
Oregon Acres, a nursery in Utah that would package and sell the trees; 
Tree Supply would provide the upfront capital to purchase the trees. 
However, as with many fledgling business ventures, the deal went south 
and the business failed. 
Seeking to recoup its lost investment, Tree Supply and its principal 
Gregory Mower filed suit against anyone remotely connected to the deal: 
Garcia, Rafiky's Nursery, LLC, Dig-A-Tree-Save-A-Tree, LLC, C.C. Mimi's 
Nursery, Michael Moyer, and Thrive Wholesale Growers, Inc. However, 
only Michael Moyer (an Oregon Acres employee) and Thrive Wholesale 
l@ Growers, Inc. (a business formed by Moyer after the events at issue in this 
appeal) were served with the complaint. The actual parties to the deal, and 
~ the parties that may have actually harmed Tree Supply, Garcia and Oregon 
Acres, were never made parties to this lawsuit. Garcia, while he was 
7 
named as a defendant, was never served with the complaint; Oregon Acres 
was not named as a defendant. 
Despite failing to prosecute its claims against those who actually 
(allegedly) harmed it, Tree Supply pressed forward in its suit against the 
wrong defendants-Moyer and Thrive-alleging claims for breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, RICO violations, conspiracy, and 
fraud. However, Tree Supply's claims suffered from one fatal flaw: neither 
Moyer nor Thrive were involved with Tree Supply's failed business 
venture. 
Eventually, Tree Supply was dismissed from this case, leaving 
Mower to prosecute the claims in his individual capacity. However, the 
claims in this case were not Mower's, they were Tree Supply's. Tree Supply 
was party to the failed venture, and only Tree Supply had standing to 
prosecute the asserted claims. Because these claims were asserted by the 
wrong plaintiff (Mower) against the wrong defendants (Moyer and 
Thrive), the district court ultimately dismissed the claims with prejudice, 
writing the final chapter of this failed business venture. 
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Unhappy with the result, Mower appealed, arguing that the district 
court erred. According to Mower, he was the party wronged by the failed 
business venture, not the company organized for the express purpose of 
"[£]arming and harvesting of trees and other nursery products, which are 
then wholesaled to supply landscape contractors." R.462. Moreover, 
Mower claims that Moyer (who was an Oregon Acres employee) and 
Moyer's new company, Thrive, are responsible for the failed deal Tree 
Supply struck with Garcia and Oregon Acres. The facts simply do not 
support this contention. The district court correctly concluded that the 
~ claims asserted in the complaint belonged to Tree Supply, not Mower, and 
that Moyer and Thrive are not liable for the actions of Garcia and Oregon 
I@ Acres. 
Furthermore, the claims in this case were dismissed for an additional 
~ reason: Mower's failure to comply with the applicable rules. The district 
court's dismissal of Mower's claims for this reason is subject to an abuse of 
l@ discretion standard. And the district court plainly did not abuse its 
discretion. Mower admittedly failed to comply with the rules or dispute 
9 
any of the facts put forth by Moyer and Thrive in their summary judgment 
motion. 
The district court did not err in dismissing Mower's claims with 
prejudice. The appellees respectfully ask this Court to affirm. 
10 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on 
the breach of contract claim when the undisputed material facts showed 
that the owner of the claim, Tree Supply, had been dismissed from the 
action, and when the remaining defendants were not party to the contract? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's 
summary judgment ruling "for correctness, granting no deference to its 
legal conclusions, and consider[s] whether it correctly concluded that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed." Johnson v. Hermes Assoc., Ltd., 2005 
~ UT 82, ,r12, 128 P.3d 1151. The facts will be viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party." Id. However, just as below, the 
(.;j nonmoving party may not rely on bare allegations or unsupported 
assertions to demonstrate the existence of a dispute of fact. Poteet v. White, 
laJ 2006 UT 63, 17, 147 P.3d 439, 441. Thus, the appellate court's task is "to 
examine the record and determine whether it establishes at least a dispute 
of fact as to the elements required." Id. at ,rs. Additionally, "an appellate 
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court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record .... " Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 
58, 110, 52 P.3d 1158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will not alter this 
standard. The purpose of Rule 52 is "to ensure that the parties have a 
written indication of the court's action and its underpinnings. To comply, 
the court need only include the basic essentials of the grounds upon which 
it relies." Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, 18, 26 P.3d 227. However, 
"failure to protest the trial court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 at 
the trial level precludes consideration of the omission on appeal." Weber v. 
Snyderville W., 800 P.2d 316,320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also Alford v. Utah 
League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that where a party "failed to object or move the trial court to correct" an 
"oversight" under Rule 52(a), the court of appeals was precluded from 
considering the error on appeal). Here, if the district court violated Rule 52, 
Mower did not "protest the trial court's apparent noncompliance" below. ~ 
See R.1-527. Accordingly, such failure cannot be considered on appeal. 
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Issue 2: Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on 
Mower's unjust enrichment claim when Mower admitted that a valid 
contract existed and that there was no need for his unjust enrichment 
claim? 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue 1. 
Preservation of Issue: Mower did not raise this issue below; instead, 
he acknowledged that the claim should be dismissed. See R.457-58 ("Given 
that Defendants admit there was an express contract, then there is no need 
for the unjust enrichment claim."). Thus, the unjust enrichment claim has 
not been preserved for appeal. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 116, 2 
P.3d 442 ("[F]ailure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a 
party from raising that argument on appeal."). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court reasonably exercise its discretion when 
~ it granted the Thrive Defendants' motion for summary judgment because 
of Mower's noncompliance with the applicable rules? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court will determine whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning a party for noncompliance 
l@ with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 
13 
25, ,r,r5, 7, 156 P.3d 175. (noting that a "trial court has discretion in 
requiring compliance with [rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]") 
(internal citation omitted, alteration in original). "A district court abuses its 
discretion only when its 'decision was against the logic of the 
circumstances and so arbitrary and umeasonable as to shock one's sense of 
justice . . . [or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. 
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,r27, 214 P.3d 859 (alteration and omission in 
original, citation omitted). Moreover, an appellate court "will presume that 
the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(quoting State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. General Oil Co., 448 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 
1968)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Plaintiffs below, Gregory Mower ("Mower") and 
his entity, Tree Supply, LLC ("Tree Supply") brought twelve claims against 
six different defendants. R.191-221. After Tree Supply and its claims were 
dismissed from the action, defendants Michael Moyer ("Moyer") and 
Thrive Wholesale Growers, Inc. ("Thrive") ( collectively the "Thrive • 
14 
Defendants") moved for summary judgment against Mower on all 
remaining claims. R.376-77; 391-448. The district court granted the Thrive 
Defendants' motion and dismissed the claims, ending the case. R.503-04. 
Only two of the dismissed claims, breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, are before this Court on appeal.1 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Mower's initial 
complaint was filed on July 9, 2013. R.1-30. About a month later, on August 
22, 2013, Moyer answered the complaint, denying all claims brought 
against him. R.73-78. That same day, Thrive brought a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6). R.82-90. Rather than dismiss the claims brought 
against Thrive, the trial court allowed Mower and Tree Supply to amend 
their complaint. R.187-88. Mower and Tree Supply filed their amended 
complaint on September 24, 2013. R.191-221. In the amended Complaint, 
I@ Mower and Tree Supply failed to distinguish which claims belonged to 
which plaintiff. Id. 
1 Mower also appealed a third claim, conversion, see R.515-16, but has not 
briefed that claim. 
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After more than a year of inactivity, Mower and Tree Supply's 
counsel moved the court for leave to withdraw as their counsel-of-record. 
R.330-34. The court granted that request. R.342-43. Shortly thereafter, in 
response to the Thrive Defendants' Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
and subsequent Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Appoint, the court 
dismissed "Tree Supply's claims in the Amended Complaint." R.376-77. 
About six weeks later, the Thrive Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all the remaining claims. R.391-448. Mower timely filed his 
opposition on August 12, 2015. R.455-464. The Thrive Defendants replied 
on August 18, 2015 at approximately 11:30 a.m. R.468-492, 497. At 8:18 p.m. 
that same day, the trial court granted the Thrive Defendants motion and 
"dismisse[d] with prejudice each of Plaintiff's claims against the Thrive 
Defendants for the reasons stated in Thrive Defendant's initial and reply 
memoranda, and Plaintiffs failure to comply with the applicable rules. R.503-04 
(emphasis in original). On September 17, 2015, Mower appealed. R.515-16. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2011, Mower needed to remove a number of trees from his 
property in Orem, which was directly across the street from Oregon Acres, ~ 
16 
a plant nursery and landscaping business. R.422-23. "[O]n a whim," Mower 
walked across the street to Oregon Acres and talked with Moyer about 
removing the trees. R.423. Moyer, an Oregon Acres employee, R.486, was 
unable to help Mower remove the trees, but referred Mower to Cornelio 
Garcia ("Garcia") as someone who could help him remove the trees. R.423-
24. 
While working together to remove Mower's trees, Garcia and Mower 
devised a joint-business venture: buying and selling trees. R.396. Mower 
organized Tree Supply for the purpose of carrying on this enterprise with 
Garcia. R.396; 415; 417-18; 430 (Mower testifying that Tree Supply was 
11 part of this deal"); 462. As Garcia and Mower developed this business 
venture, they decided to involve Oregon Acres. R.397; 424. To facilitate this 
deal, Garcia and Mower met with Moyer. R.438. Mower knew at that time 
~ that Moyer was an agent or representative of Oregon Acres and was acting 
in that capacity. R.397; 426; 428. 
As part of this deal, Tree Supply would provide capital and property 
to store the trees, Garcia would purchase and transport the trees to Utah, 
~ and Oregon Acres would package and sell the trees. R.397; 429. Pursuant 
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to this agreement, Moyer, on behalf of Oregon Acres, removed 
approximately 60 trees that were being stored at a property in Payson, 
Utah in February 2012. R.397; 434-37. Shortly thereafter, Tree Supply sent 
an invoice to Moyer at Oregon Acres for the 60 trees. R.397; 252. Mower 
sent the invoice on Tree Supply letterhead, and signed the invoice as the 
owner of Tree Supply. R.398; 252. However, Oregon Acres never paid Tree 
Supply for the trees and the business venture failed. Subsequently, Tree 
Supply and Mower filed their complaint in this action. R.439. 
On March 8, 2012, Thrive's Articles of Organization were filed. R. 
474; 485-87. Oregon Acres and Thrive do not have a common identity of 
stock. Id. Oregon Acres and Thrive do not have the same directors or 
stockholders. Id. As of October 7, 2013, Oregon Acres continued to exist. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court correctly dismissed the breach of contract claim. <tJ 
A person that is not a party to a contract cannot sue on that contract. 
Because Mower was not a party to the contract at issue here, he cannot iJ 
prosecute the breach of contract claim. Relying upon Mower's own 
deposition testimony, the Thrive Defendants showed below that the ~ 
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contract in this case was between Tree Supply, Oregon Acres, and Garcia. 
Mower put forth no evidence to dispute this fact. To the contrary, Mower 
confirmed this fact. Because Mower is, admittedly, not a party to the 
contract at issue in this case, he lacks standing to prosecute the breach of 
contract claim. On this basis alone, the district court should be affirmed. 
Moreover, the undisputed facts further show that neither of the 
Thrive Defendants were a party to that agreement. Accordingly, even if 
Mower had standing to bring the breach of contract claim, he cannot 
prosecute it against non-parties to the contract-the Thrive Defendants. 
Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract claim 
should be upheld. 
The district court correctly dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. 
An unjust enrichment claim is precluded by the existence of an express 
~ contract. Mower conceded below that his unjust enrichment claim was 
preempted by the contract between Tree Supply, Garcia, and Oregon 
\@ Acres. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim 
should be affirmed. 
19 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the 
Thrive Defendants' summary judgment motion because of Mower's 
noncompliance with the rules. It is entirely within the discretion of the 
district court to require compliance with the applicable rules. Moreover, 
appellate courts presume that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
In this case, Mower failed to comply with the then-existing version of Rule 
7(c)(3)(B). Not only did Mower fail to provide a "verbatim restatement of 
each of the moving party's facts that is controverted," he also failed to 
dispute the facts in the body of his opposition memorandum or support his 
disputes of fact "by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials." Given Mower's total failure to comply with Rule 
7(c)(3)(B), the district court was justified in granting the Thrive Defendants' 
motion because of Mower's noncompliance with the rules. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Dismissed the Breach of Contract 
Claim. 
The issue before this Court is not whether the Thrive Defendants 
breached a contract, but rather, whether a claim for breach of contract can 
20 
be prosecuted by a non-party to the contract against defendants who were 
~ 
not parties to the contract. It cannot. Shire Dev. v. Frontier lnvs., 799 P.2d 
221, 223 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a 
person not in privity cannot sue on a contract."). As the undisputed 
material facts show, the breach of contract claim belonged to Tree Supply, 
and when it was dismissed from this action, the breach of contract claim 
left with it. Thus, Mower cannot prosecute this claim. Even if Mower had 
standing to enforce the contract, he could enforce it against only Oregon 
Acres and/ or Garcia, not the Thrive Defendants. Accordingly, the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim should 
be affirmed. 
In his opposition to the Thrive Defendants' summary judgment 
motion, Mower argued that summary judgment was improper because the 
~ Thrive Defendants "have not presented any evidence to support their claim 
that the contract was between Tree Supply and Oregon Acres, other than my 
(@ deposition testimony." R.456 (emphasis added). Attempting to obfuscate his 
admission that his sworn testimony shows that the contract was between 
~ Tree Supply and Oregon Acres, Mower argues on appeal that the evidence 
21 
in the record creates an issue of fact as to who were parties to the contract. 
Mower's arguments do not invalidate his prior admission nor do they 
present this Court with a basis for reversing the court below. 
a. Tree Supply, not Mower, was a party to the contract. 
Mower's present attempts to dispute the facts he did not dispute 
below, including his own verified testimony, fail to create a genuine 
dispute of material fact as to whether he was a party to the contract with 
Oregon Acres. At issue on appeal is who the parties to an oral contract are. 
Determining the parties to a contract is a simple matter of contract 
interpretation. When interpreting a contract, a court's pre-eminent duty is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties. WebBank v. Am. 
Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ~17, 54 P.3d 1139. Typically, a court 
will "look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions." Id. at 
~18. Here, however, there is no writing- it is an oral contract. Thus, the ~ 
intentions of the parties "must be ascertained by reference to the conduct of 
the parties under the contract." Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F.Supp. 724, 732 ~ 
(D. Utah 1992). See also, Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 
162, ~20, 92 P.3d 768 (noting that a contract ambiguity may be resolved by ~ 
22 
considering "the parties' actions and performance as evidence of the 
parties' true intention"); Comm. Union Assoc. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "the conduct of the parties" may show assent to 
the terms of a contract). 
The conduct of the parties shows that Tree Supply owns the breach of 
contract claim, not Mower. In his deposition, Mower admitted that he 
created Tree Supply as the vehicle for his deal with Garcia and Oregon 
Acres. See R.396; 415-18; 462. Mower communicated this to both Garcia, 
R.415, and to Oregon Acres. R.397-98; 252. Mower further admitted that 
Tree Supply, not Mower personally, was a party to the contract. R.397; 456. 
These statements and actions by Mower conclusively establish that Tree 
Supply, not Mower, was a party to the contract. 
Below, Mower offered no evidence to dispute these facts-he 
~ acknowledged their veracity. R.456 (admitting that his own deposition 
testimony "support[ed the] claim that the contract was between Tree 
~ Supply and Oregon Acres"). See also Poteet, 2006 UT 63, ~7 (at summary 
judgment, sworn testimony cannot be rebutted by unsupported 
~ allegations). Despite introducing no evidence to contradict these facts, 
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Mower now attempts to dispute his own testimony. For instance, Mower 
now asserts that Tree Supply being a party to the contract was merely "his 
unexpressed intentions," and that, consequently, the other parties believed 
they were contracting with Mower personally. Mower's Brief at 23. The 
facts disagree with this assertion. See R.252 (Tree Supply sent an invoice to 
Oregon Acres for the trees); 397-98 (Tree Supply entered into the contract); 
415 (testifying that "we [Mower and Garcia] started the idea of Tree 
Supply .... "). Moreover, Mower noted to this Court that Tree Supply was a 
joint idea between him and Garcia. Mower's Brief at 12. Certainly, Mower 
expressed his belief that Tree Supply was a party to the contract through 
his words and deeds. Mower cannot now, five years after the fact, walk 
back his conduct showing that Tree Supply was a party to the contract. 
Mower also asserts that because Tree Supply was not registered with 
the State of Utah until February 2012, Tree Supply cannot be a party to the 
contract. The Record shows otherwise. Mower testified that Tree Supply 
was formed contemporaneous with the execution of the contract. R.396, ~ 
417-18. Moreover, Tree Supply was officially registered with the State of 
Utah about the time Garcia began purchasing trees pursuant to the contract ~ 
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and Oregon Acres began attempting to sell the trees. R.397, 459, 462. The 
timing of these actions indicates that Tree Supply was intended to be a 
party to the contract, which is entirely consistent with Mower's testimony 
that the company was formed for the purpose of performing under the 
contract. R.396-98, 415, 417. 
Even if Tree Supply was not officially formed until February 2012, it 
was still party to the contract because it ratified the contract. "It is well-
established under Utah law that [s]ubsequent affirmance by a principal of a 
contract made on his behalf by one who had at the time neither actual nor 
apparent authority constitutes a ratification, which in general is as effectual 
as an original authorization." Simmons Media Group, LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 
2014 UT App 145, if24, 335 P.3d 885 (internal citation omitted, alteration in 
original). Contrary to Mower's claims, such ratification "need not be 
~ express." Id. "Any conduct which indicates assent by the purported 
principal [i.e., Tree Supply] to become a party to the transaction ... is 
~ sufficient." Id. This doctrine has particular application in contract cases to 
"establish the validity of an act even though certain, express formalities 
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have not been met." Swan Creek Village Homeowners Assoc. v. Warne, 2006 
UT 22, 134, 134 P.3d 1122. 
Here, Tree Supply's conduct indicates that it ratified the contract (if it 
was not already a party). After Oregon Acres received some of the trees, 
Tree Supply, in an invoice signed by its owner, requested payment for the 
trees. R.398; 252. If Tree Supply had not ratified the contract, it could not 
have requested payment for the trees. This conduct demonstrates that Tree 
Supply, if it was not already a party to the contract, ratified the contract 
and subsequently became a party thereto. 
Mower's reliance on Anderson and Miller does not alter this result. In 
Anderson v. Gardner, the court found that Gardner, who purported to sign 
an agreement as an agent for a radio station, was personally liable on a 
contract. 647 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982). That case is inapplicable here for two key 
reasons. First, Gardner signed the contract "without any indication that he 
is signing for any other party or in any other capacity than for himself." Id. 
at 4 (noting this is "the key fact"). Here, Mower provided an indication to ~ 
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both Garcia and Oregon Acres that he was acting on behalf of Tree Supply.2 
See R.397-98; 415; 252. For example, Mower sent an invoice-the only 
written demand for payment-on Tree Supply letterhead, then later 
testified that he signed the invoice as owner of Tree Supply. R.398; 252. 
This provides a clear indication to Garcia and Oregon Acres that Tree 
Supply was party to the contract. Second, and most importantly, Anderson 
dealt with whether Gardner was liable under the contract, not whether he 
could prosecute a breach of contract claim. Id. Thus, Anderson does not 
answer the question presented to this Court: whether Mower can sue for 
breach of contract under a contract he was not a party to. Accordingly, 
Anderson does not show that the trial court erred. 
Similarly, Miller does not support Mower's claim that the trial court 
should be reversed. In fact, it shows the opposite-that the trial court 
~ correctly dismissed the breach of contract claim. In Miller, United Silver 
Mines, Inc. was dissolved on August 1, 1991. Miller v. Celebration Mining 
Co., 2001 UT 64, if3, 29 P.3d 1231. Three years later, Thomas Miller, who 
2 As explained above, to determine the parties' intent with regards to this 
oral contract, the Court should examine the parties' conduct. 
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had been United' s president, entered into a contract with Celebration 
Mining Company. Id. Miller signed the contract as United's president. Id. 
The contract went south, however, and Miller brought suit against 
Celebration (and others) for breach of contract. Id. at if4. Celebration 
moved for dismissal of Miller's breach of contract claim, arguing "because 
he acted in his capacity as president of United in executing [the contract], 
he was not a party to the agreement and therefore could not individually 
enforce its provisions." Id. at ,rs. The district court agreed and dismissed 
Miller's claims. Id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at if 6. 
On appeal, Miller argued that he had standing to sue under the 
contract because he would be liable under the contract according to UTAH 
CODE §16-lOa-204. Id. at if 7. At the time, §16-lOa-204 provided that "All 
persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there 
was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for ~ 
all liabilities created while so acting." Id. The Supreme Court noted, 
however, that the code section "speaks only to the liability of 'persons ~ 
purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation."' Id. at ,rs (internal 
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citation omitted, emphasis in original). The section is silent as to whether 
such "persons" can enforce contracts. Id. 
Miller, like Mower here, asked the court to apply the principle of 
'"mutuality of obligation,' which requires that where a party is held 
contractually liable under a given set of circumstances, that party is also 
able to enforce the contract on its own behalf under those same 
circumstances." Id. at if 9. The Court declined to do so, holding that "the 
application of the principle of mutuality of obligation in a case such as this 
one has great potential to create a contract one party never intended to 
enter." Id. at ,Ill. In other words, Miller lacked standing to sue on the 
contract. 
The result must be the same here. Mower, like Miller, entered into a 
contract on behalf of an allegedly non-existent company. In addition, 
i:@ Mower signed the invoice as owner of Tree Supply, just as Miller signed 
the contract as president of United. R.398. Then, when the deal went south, 
<@ Mower tried to sue on the contract, just as Miller tried to sue on the 
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contract in Miller. Given the similarity of these two cases, the result must be 
the same- dismissal of the breach of contract claim. 3 
Because the undisputed facts show that Tree Supply, not Mower, was 
a party to the contract, the trial court did not err by dismissing the breach 
of contract claim. See Shire Dev., 799 P.2d at 223 ("It is axiomatic in the law 
of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract."). 
b. Oregon Acres, not the Thrive Defendants, was a party to the 
contract. 
Even if Mower had standing to sue on the contract, he cannot sue the 
Thrive Defendants. The undisputed material facts show that Oregon Acres, 
represented by its agent Moyer, entered into the contract with Tree Supply. 
In his deposition, Mower stated: "Q: So who was the deal with .... A: It 
started-with my understanding, it started as what I- I guess what I 
thought would be an Oregon Acres deal with Mike Moyer as either the 
owner or the manager or the president." R.397. Mower has put forth no 
3 One significant difference exists between Miller and the present dispute-
the defendants in Miller were parties to the contract, while the Thrive 
Defendants are not. As explained in the following section, this difference 
provides the Court with an additional ground to affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of the breach of contract claim. 
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competent evidence to rebut this statement. Poteet, 2006 UT 63, 17 (at 
summary judgment, sworn testimony cannot be rebutted by unsupported 
allegations). 
Mower subsequently confirmed that the contract was with Oregon 
Acres, not Moyer, in his opposition below. He stated, "Defendants have not 
presented any evidence to support their claim that the contract was 
between Tree Supply and Oregon Acres, other than my deposition testimony 
that I thought Mr. Moyer was acting as president of Oregon Acres." R.456 
(emphasis added). Mower believed he, on behalf of Tree Supply, was 
contracting with Oregon Acres. He cannot now dispute his sworn 
testimony on that point. Therefore, the undisputed material facts show that 
Oregon Acres was party to the contract. 
The mere fact that Moyer was present for the contract negotiations 
~ and removed trees pursuant to the agreement does not alter this result. 
Mower knew that Moyer was acting in his capacity as an agent or 
~ representative of Oregon Acres. R.397; 426; 428. While a corporation may 
legally be considered a "person," it cannot operate independently. The 
corporation can only operate through its agents. Because Mower knew that 
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he was meeting with Moyer in his capacity as an agent of Oregon Acres, 
Mower cannot show that the contract was with Moyer personally. 
Therefore, Moyer cannot be sued on the contract. 
Similarly, Thrive Wholesale Growers cannot be liable under the 
contract. The trial court below agreed with this sentiment. On appeal 
Mower argues that Thrive is liable on the contract because (a) Moyer was 
its agent, (b) Thrive ratified the contract or (c) Thrive is liable as a successor 
to Oregon Acres. Mower is wrong on all three points. 
First, Mower has put no evidence into the record to show that Moyer 
was Thrive' s agent. In fact, the best evidence on this point (Mower's 
testimony) shows that Mower knew that Moyer was acting as an agent of 
Oregon Acres. R.397; 426; 428. Thus, there is no evidence in the record to 
show that Moyer was acting as Thrive's agent beyond Mower's 
speculation, which is wholly insufficient to defeat a summary judgment 
motion. Poteet, 2006 UT 63, 17. 
Second, Mower never raised the ratification issue below. See R.455- ~ 
458. Thus, this issue has not been preserved and can be summarily 
dismissed. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 116, 2 P.3d 442 ("[F]ailure to ~ 
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raise an argument before the trial court precludes a party from raising that 
argument on appeal."). Even if this claim was properly preserved, there is 
no evidence in the record to show that Thrive ratified the contract. See R.1-
527. Mower has presented no evidence that Thrive took any actions to 
ratify the contract. His only evidence is an affidavit, which was not 
presented during the summary judgment proceedings, wherein he testified 
that on an unstated date he went to Moyer's "place of business ... [that] 
was called Thrive Wholesale Growers." R.177-78. Looking past the fact that 
the affidavit was not presented to the court below,4 it does not show that 
Thrive received any of the trees at issue in this case. Nor does it provide 
any evidence to show that it was a party to or ratified the contract. Thus, 
(@ there is no factual basis for Mower's assertion that Thrive ratified the 
contract. 
4 See, e.g., Jennings Investments, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 
119, ,126, 208 P.3d 1077 (A court is "not obliged to comb the record to 
determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists to prevent 
summary judgment."). 
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Third, Thrive is not a "successor" to Oregon Acres. To be liable for 
the debts of its predecessor, the purchaser must have purchased all the 
predecessors assets and 
(1) the purchase expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such 
debts; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger 
of the seller and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is 
merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the 
transaction is entered into [by the seller and the purchaser] 
fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts. 
Macri.s & Assoc., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, ,r20, 60 P.3d 
1176. However, as with his other claims, Mower has put forth no 
evidence to support his assertion that Thrive is a successor to Oregon 
Acres. Below, Mower's sole proof of this claim was to state that "[i]t 
appears that Thrive Wholesale Growers is a successor to Oregon 
Acres. They have the same owners, same address, and same 
employees." R.456.5 Mower provided no documents, testimony, or 
any other admissible evidence to substantiate this claim. Similarly, 
Mower's present claim that the transfer of assets to Thrive was 
5 By this statement, Mower appears to claim that Thrive is liable as a mere 
"continuation" of Oregon Acres. 
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fraudulent is likewise supported by nothing more than Mower's own 
speculation. 
This failure of proof is fatal to Mower's claim. See Brigham Truck 
& Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987) 
("[C]ontentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in 
support thereof, raise no material questions of fact."). See also Dairy 
Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r54, 13 P.3d 581 (" An 
affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions 
and conclusions is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact."). 
Nevertheless, to be sure, "[a] continuation demands 'a common 
identity of stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one 
corporation at the completion of the transfer." Decius v. Action Collections 
Serv., Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ,rs, 105 P.3d 956. There is no common identity 
@ of stock and no common stockholders between Thrive and Oregon Acres, 
and Oregon Acres continues to exist. R.474; 485-87. Therefore, there is no 
~ basis for continuation liability. Consequently, Mower has provided no 
basis for this Court to find that Thrive is liable on the contract. 
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It is Mower's burden as the plaintiff to prove his claims and present 
this Court with evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 17, 177 P.3d 600. Mower has wholly 
failed to carry that burden. He has presented no evidence to dispute the 
fact that he was not a party to the contract. See, e.g., R.456. Likewise, he has 
pointed to no evidence in the record to show that the Thrive Defendants 
were parties to the contract. Because Mower has failed to meet his burden, 
it is undisputed that the breach of contract claim belonged to Tree Supply 
and could be prosecuted against only Oregon Acres and Garcia. Therefore, 
this Court must affirm the trial court's dismissal of the breach of contract 
claim. 
II. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Mower's Unjust 
Enrichment Claim. 
a. Mower's unjust enrichment claim is barred by the existence of 
an express contract governing the same subject matter. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is II designed to provide an 
equitable remedy where one does not exist at law." Am. Towers Owners ~ 
Assoc., Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). That is, 
11 if a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express contract, the ~ 
36 
law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment." Id. See also 
Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, 114, 227 P.3d 246 (holding that "a prerequisite 
for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an 
enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties 
relating to the conduct at issue"). 
Here, it is undisputed that an express contract governed the rights 
and obligations of the parties relating to the trees at issue in this dispute. 
See R.397; R.459-60 ("'In October 2011, I met with Michael Moyer and he 
agreed to a contract .... ") (emphasis added). In fact, Mower recognized this in 
his opposition to the Thrive Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
He wrote, "[g]iven that Defendants admit there was an express contract, 
then there is no need for the unjust enrichment claim." R.458. Therefore, 
the undisputed facts show that an express contract governed the subject 
matter of Mower's unjust enrichment claim and this Court should affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of that claim. 
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b. Mower failed to preserve his unjust enrichment claim for 
appeal. ~ 
Mower's concession on his unjust enrichment claim prevents him 
from re-raising that claim on appeal. In other words, he failed to preserve ~ 
his claim. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 116, 2 P.3d 442 ("[F]ailure to 
raise an argument before the trial court precludes a party from raising that ~ 
argument on appeal."). As held by the Utah Supreme Court, to preserve an 
issue for appeal, "the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a 
way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 114, 48 P.3d 968. A trial court 
has had such an opportunity when the issue was (1) "raised in a timely 
fashion;" (2) "specifically raised;" and (3) when the party has "introduce[d] 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (internal citation 
omitted). Mower has failed to meet all three elements. 
In this case, Mower never presented this issue to the trial court, thus 
it can be considered neither "timely" or "specifically" raised. In fact, when 
presented with the opportunity to raise his unjust enrichment claim, 
Mower instead conceded that "there is no need for the unjust enrichment 
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claim." R.458. Moreover, Mower introduced no "supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority" to support this claim. R.457-58. Mower not only 
failed to cite to any case law or other applicable authority, the only 
"supporting evidence" he provided to the court (which, incidentally, he 
did not reference in defending his unjust enrichment claim) showed that an 
express contract existed and covered the same subject matter. R.460 
(testifying that a contract was agreed to regarding the trees). Therefore, 
Mower has failed to preserve his unjust enrichment claim for appeal. 
c. Mower's newly-raised arguments do not alter this outcome. 
On appeal, Mower asserts a number of new arguments in support of 
his unjust enrichment claim: (1) that there is no valid contract; (2) that the 
Thrive Defendants actually received and improperly benefited from the 
trees; and (3) that the unjust enrichment claim belongs to Mower, not Tree 
(.,i) Supply. Even if this Court ignores that Mower's unjust enrichment claim is 
barred by the existence of an express contract, and ignores that Mower 
<.j conceded this claim below, Mower's appeal still fails. 
As to Mower's first argument, a valid contract exists, as shown 
v, above. Mower acknowledged this in his opposition below. R.458 (noting 
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that "there is no need for the unjust enrichment claim"); 460 ("I met with 
Michael Moyer and he agreed to a contract .... ") (emphasis added). There is 
no basis for finding otherwise. 
Mower also makes the perplexing argument that the trees taken from 
the Payson property were not part of the contract between Tree Supply and 
Oregon Acres. See Mower's brief at 37-38. Not only was this argument not 
raised below, it was not pied by Mower in his complaint. R.217-18. As pied 
by Mower, the unjust enrichment claim is based upon Moyer allegedly 
receiving a personal benefit from removing the trees Tree Supply 
purchased for its contract with Oregon Acres. R.217-18 at 1224.6 The claim 
is also premised upon Moyer removing trees from the Payson property "as 
part of the Moyer Payson Incidents." R.218 at 1225. The "Moyer Payson 
Incidents" is defined to include Moyer's removal of trees from the Payson 
property that were sent there "as part of the Garcia/Moyer Contract." 
R.202-03. Accordingly, Mower has never argued, or pied, that the trees 
Moyer received on behalf of Oregon Acres were not part of the contract. See 
also R. 434-35 ("Q: But these trees were part of that deal? A: Yes."). Mower 
6 The unjust enrichment claim was brought against Moyer only, not Thrive. 
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cannot assert such a claim for the first time on appeal when it was never 
pied or raised below. See Sittner 2000 UT 45, ,r16. It is therefore, undisputed 
that the contract governs the actions that form the basis of the unjust 
enrichment claim. 
With regards to the second argument, Mower has put forth no 
evidence to show that the Thrive Defendants received and improperly 
benefitted from the trees. For instance, Mower argues that certain 
statements made by Moyer show that he was receiving a personal benefit 
from the trees. The record paints a different picture. Mower knew that 
Moyer was acting as an agent of Oregon Acres and that he took the trees in 
that capacity. R.397; 426; 428. In fact, when Tree Supply requested 
payment, it sent the invoice to 11Mike Moyer - Oregon Acres." R.252. 
Moreover, Mower's only evidence that Oregon Acres did not receive the 
trees is his own speculation. See R.1-527. This is insufficient to defeat a 
summary judgment claim. Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, ,r7, 147 P.3d 439, 
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441.7 Thus, there is no evidence that the Thrive Defendants received and 
improperly benefitted from the trees. 
Finally, Mower's remaining argument, that he owned the unjust 
enrichment claim and could prosecute it against the Thrive Defendants, is 
also unsupported by the Record. As shown in the preceding section, it was 
Tree Supply, and not Mower, that purchased the trees involved in the 
contract. Moreover, as shown, neither Moyer nor Thrive benefited 
personally from the trees. 
Therefore, because Mower conceded this claim, and because neither 
of the Thrive Defendants received an improper benefit from the trees, the 
trial court did not err in dismissing the unjust enrichment claim. 
III. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by 
Dismissing the Remaining Claims Because of Mower's 
Failure to Comply with the Applicable Rules. 
Regardless of how this Court decides the first two issues on appeal, 
the trial court's decision to grant the Thrive Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment because of Mower's II failure to comply with the ~ 
7 Significantly, the unjust enrichment claim was only pied against Moyer, ~ 
not Thrive. R.217-18. 
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applicable rules," R.504, must be upheld unless the trial court abused its 
discretion in so ordering. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ,7, 156 
P.3d 175. On appeal, it is presumed "that the discretion of the trial court 
was properly exercised." Goddard, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). To 
overcome this presumption, Mower must put forth evidence from the 
record that "clearly shows" that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 
Mower has not made this showing and the trial court must be affirmed. 
a. The district court was within its discretion in dismissing the 
remaining claims. 
"A district court abuses its discretion only when its 'decision was 
against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as 
to shock one's sense of justice . . . [or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or 
malice." Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,27, 214 P.3d 859 (alteration 
and omission in original, citation omitted). In this case, the district court's 
decision was reasonable and consistent with the logic of the circumstances. 
When the Thrive Defendants filed their motion for summary 
judgment, Rule 7(c)(3)(B) provided: 
[a] memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment 
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving 
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party's facts that is controverted .... For each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall 
provide an explanation of the grounds for any such dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
As provided by this rule, it is the burden of the non-moving party-
Mower- to demonstrate that a genuine dispute of fact exists. Jennings 
Investments, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 126, 208 P.3d 
1077. A court is "not obliged to comb the record to determine whether a 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists to prevent summary judgment." 
Id. Consequently, if a party fails to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), a court may 
use its discretion to deem facts undisputed or to grant a motion for 
summary judgment. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT App 25, 113, 12. In this case, the 
trial court chose the latter and dismissed Mower's claims. 
Mower admits he failed to provide a verbatim restatement of each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted. R.455-458. See also Mower's ~ 
Appellate Brief at 43 ("Here, Mower failed to strictly comply with Rule 7 
because he did not set forth a verbatim restatement of each of the moving ~ 
party's facts that are controverted."). This alone supports the trial court's 
decision and shows that its exercise of discretion was reasonable. See ~ 
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Bluffdale, 2007 UT App 25, ~12 (noting that it is within the court's discretion 
to grant summary judgment for noncompliance with Rule 7(c)(3)(B)). In 
light of this admission, Mower cannot clearly show from the Record that 
the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and its order dismissing Mower's claims must stand. 
Nevertheless, Mower contends that the court abused its discretion 
because Mower's noncompliance with the rules was harmless. Mower 
argues that his noncompliance was harmless because he disputed the 
Thrive Defendants' facts in the body of his memorandum. However, this 
argument is unsupported by the Record and is ultimately, fruitless. 
Moreover, this argument does not clearly show that the court abused its 
(:j discretion. 
In support of his claim that his failure was harmless, Mower relies 
~ upon the holding in Salt Lake Cnty. v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 
89 P.3d 155. In that case, the court noted that the non-moving party failed 
<@ to "set forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a separate 
section as required by" applicable rules. Id. at 123n.4. Nevertheless, the 
court did not penalize the party for this violation because "the disputed 
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facts were clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with 
applicable record references." Id. This decision was within the trial court's 
discretion. See Bluffdale, 2007 UT App 25, if 9. 
However, unlike the party in Metro West, Mower not only failed to 
set forth a verbatim restatement of the Thrive Defendants' fact, he also 
failed to dispute those facts in the body of his memorandum with any 
references to the record or admissible evidence. In the entirety of his 
opposition, Mower cited to nothing in the record to dispute these, or any 
other facts asserted by the Thrive Defendants. R.455-458. Because Mower's 
opposition is bereft of any citations to admissible evidence or any 
11 coherent explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required by rule 
7(c)(3)(B)," Metro West is inapplicable and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting summary judgment on Mower's claims. Bluffdale, 
2007 UT App 25, ifll.8 
Bluffdale City v. Smith is the more analogous case to the present 
dispute. There, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, 
8 Even if Metro West was applicable, the decision to grant summary 
judgment because of Mower's noncompliance with the rules was still 
within the trial court's discretion. Bluffdale, 2007 UT App 25, ,rs. 
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"together with a supporting memorandum and the affidavits of [two 
individuals]." Id. at 12. In response, the defendants "filed an opposing 
memorandum with the affidavit of Taylor Smith." Id. However, the 
defendants memorandum "failed to comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B)" because it 
"did not contain a verbatim restatement of Plaintiff's stated facts . . . and 
did not cite to any relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials." Id. at 13. The district court found that the defendants "failed to 
comply with the directives of rule 7( c)(3)(B)" and "granted Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment." Id. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Id. at 11. 
Like Mower, the defendants in Bluffdale City argued that the holding 
@ from Metro West precluded the court from granting summary judgment. Id. 
at 110. This Court disagreed, noting that Bluffdale City was distinguishable 
(j) because the defendants "failed to provide the specific disputed facts 
together with applicable record references in the body of their opposing 
@ memorandum." Id. Because the defendants in Bluffdale City "did not 
include a coherent explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required 
@ by rule 7(c)(3)(B)" nor did they, "with the exception of two nonspecific 
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references to the Smith affidavit, provide supporting citations as the basis 
for any dispute of fact," this Court found that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion "when it granted Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment based on Defendants' noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)(B)." Id. at 
111. 
Bluffdale City is nearly identical to the present case. In both instances, 
the non-moving party failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B)'s mandate to 
restate the moving parties facts and controvert the facts with citations to 
applicable evidence. For instance, in both cases, the party opposing 
summary judgment attached an affidavit to their opposition, but failed to 
make more than a "nonspecific reference[]" to it. See R.455 (the sole 
reference to the Mower Affidavit). Moreover, in both cases, the non-
moving party failed to explain, with applicable record citations, the basis 
for any disputes of fact. In light of Mower's total failure to provide 
evidentiary support for any of his disputes of fact, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting the Thrive Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 111 (where the defendants acted the same as 
Mower, "the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted ~ 
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Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on Defendants' 
noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)(B)"). 
Moreover, even if Mower had properly cited to his affidavit in his 
opposition, his instant argument remains unavailing. A party cannot 
contradict his deposition testimony by a subsequent affidavit without 
providing an explanation for the contradictions. See Harnicher v. Univ. of 
Utah Med. Ctr., 851 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998). In this case, Mower's deposition 
testimony shows that the contract was between Tree Supply and Oregon 
Acres. R.397; 456. Mower even acknowledged this fact in the body of his 
opposition, stating, "Defendants have not presented any evidence to 
support their claim that the contract was between Tree Supply and Oregon 
Acres, other than my deposition testimony." R.456 (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, Mower attempted to refute his own sworn testimony by his 
affidavit. As a matter of law, Mower cannot do so. Therefore, even if the 
court viewed Mower's affidavit and made Mower's arguments for him, 
@ Mower has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
the Thrive Defendants' motion because of Mower's failure to comply with 
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Rule 7(c)(3)(B)'s mandate to restate the moving party's facts and controvert 
those facts with citations to applicable evidence. 
b. The decision to grant Mower leniency was within the sound 
discretion of the district court. ~ 
The decision whether to grant a pro se litigant leniency is within the 
discretion of the trial court. See Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, ® 
2010 UT App 257, ,r18, 241 P.3d 375 (holding the trial court's decision not 
to grant a pro se litigant leniency was "not an abuse of its discretion"). 
Moreover, on appeal, it is presumed "that the discretion of the trial court 
was properly exercised." Goddard, 685 P.2d at 534-35. 
Here, the trial court was well within its discretion in deciding not to 
grant Mower leniency as a pro se litigant. The default rule is that "a party 
who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge 
and practice as any qualified member of the bar." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 
4, ,r19, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation omitted). The trial court had 
observed the actions of the parties and the contours of this case from its 
inception. R.1-527. Based on its knowledge of the parties and the case, the 
trial court decided not to grant Mower leniency. This decision not to afford 
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Mower leniency should be upheld as reasonable and within the bounds of 
its discretion. See Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,I27, 214 P.3d 859. 
Mower has failed to point to any evidence showing that the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in so holding, and therefore, the decision must 
be sustained. 
c. The district court did not merely deem the facts undisputed, but 
if it did, summary judgment was still appropriately granted on 
Mower's claims. 
In its order, the trial court granted summary judgment because of 
"the reasons stated in Thrive Defendant's initial and reply memoranda, 
and Plaintiff's failure to comply with the applicable rules." R.504. Thus, 
summary judgment was granted because of Mower's noncompliance with 
@ the rules. Despite this clear statement from the court, Mower asserts that 
the trial court merely deemed the Thrive Defendants' facts undisputed 
@ because of his noncompliance. Consequently, Mower asserts that summary 
judgment was inappropriate because the facts, even if deemed true, do not 
@ support the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. 
Disregarding the plain language of the court's order and assuming 
Mower was correct that the trial court merely deemed the facts undisputed 
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(rather than granting summary judgment as the order states), Mower's 
argument does not entitle him to a reversal of the court's decision. The 
undisputed facts show that the contract at issue was between Tree Supply 
and Oregon Acres. R.397. As shown above, this alone defeats Mower's 
breach of contract claim. Moreover, it also shows that an express contract 
exists, which, as also shown above, defeats Mower's unjust emichment 
claim. Therefore, even if Mower's interpretation of the court's order was 
correct, it would still not entitle him to reversal. 
The trial court's exercise of its discretion is afforded great respect and 
is presumed to be reasonable. Goddard, 685 P.2d at 534-35. Mower has failed 
to make the required "clear showing" that the trial court abused its 
discretion. As a result, the trial court must be affirmed. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Thrive Defendants respectfully ask this 
Court to affirm the decision of the district court. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2016. 
KIRTON McCONKIE P.C. 
By: fbwfr Jl-v_ on / 
Atfomeys for Appellees Michael 
Moyer and Thrive Wholesale 
Growers, Inc . 
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